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Abstract
The Berliner Verkehrsbetriebe (BVG) has succeeded in increasing its revenue by 
more than 22 percent in three years. This was made possible by restructuring the 
transportation network as part of an integrated marketing strategy. Traffic simula-
tions demonstrated that improving frequency on the main lines could shorten travel 
times and attract many new customers to public transportation. In addition, lines 
outside the core network with little utilization were identified where service could be 
reduced to achieve significant cost savings with only a slight decline in the number 
of passengers. In 2004, new premium products, the MetroBus and MetroTram, were 
introduced; in 2006, their services were improved yet further. Today, the MetroBus 
and MetroTram run on the 26 most important lines (in addition to the subway), 24 
hours a day at very short intervals. They are intensively marketed, and customers can 
understand the Metro network almost as well as they can the subway network. The 
new MetroBus and MetroTram products have achieved great success, with passenger 
volume on some lines rising by more than 30 percent. Overall, the BVG has gained 
more than 21 million new trips per year and reduced its annual operating costs by 
more than 9.5 million euros.
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Introduction
All public transportation companies in Germany depend on various types of 
subsidies to provide their range of services because ticket fares alone do not cover 
operational costs. Budget constraints in public funding over the past several years 
have reduced the level of subsidies for public transportation in Germany, and 
prompted demands for considerably greater efficiency in public transport opera-
tions.
The transportation companies have succeeded in raising efficiency levels over the 
past several years; they are covering expenses to an increasing degree and thus 
reducing their need for subsidies. In general, they have achieved these results 
through cost-saving efforts such as cutting services, streamlining organizational 
structures, and improving process efficiency. The companies have found it much 
more difficult, however, to improve results by increasing revenues.
The BVG (Berliner Verkehrsbetriebe) is also currently undergoing a restructuring 
process. When the BVG (West Berlin) and the BVB (East Berlin) merged in the 
early 990s, the company had a combined total of more than 8,000 employees. 
Only about ,000 of them remain today. These advances on the cost side, how-
ever, have been met with only moderate increases or stagnation in ticket revenue 
since the late 990s. In 00, ticket revenue decreased for the first time. As a 
consequence, BVG management took a number of steps in early 003 to increase 
revenues from ticket sales. These steps focused on integrated marketing with the 
aim of utilizing all four relevant mechanisms—new services, fare structures, adver-
tising, and sales—and on the customers themselves, namely on what services they 
need and on how much they are prepared to pay for them.
Based on this approach, BVG management launched the BVG 005 Plus project in 
003 to optimize services. By December 3, 004, the greatest change in timetables 
in the history of the BVG had taken place. In the process, the company also intro-
duced two new products, MetroBus and MetroTram, initially as daytime services 
and, later, during the night as well.
This project represented another ground-breaking activity for the BVG. For years, 
services had largely been determined on the basis of optimizing operations. But 
now, the BVG undertook a comprehensive, corridor-by-corridor analysis of all 
traffic patterns in the city and of the strengths and weaknesses of the public trans-
portation system. Moreover, customers and media representatives were included 
in the planning, not only to increase acceptance for the project, but also to incor-
porate as many ideas and suggestions for improvement as possible. 
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Despite the strong wish to orient services toward customers, the project faced the 
additional challenge of having to cut operations and therefore costs to a signifi-
cant degree at the same time. The ambitious aim of the project, namely to increase 
the number of customers by  percent while simultaneously cutting operations 
by 3 percent, was frequently described as akin to squaring a circle. The fact that it 
nevertheless succeeded, and with tight deadlines as well, is due to an extraordinary 
effort put forth by many BVG employees, especially from the planning offices of 
the central marketing department, the bus and tram divisions, and public rela-
tions, as well as from external engineering offices, consulting firms, and agencies. 
Not without pride, we note that comparable projects in other German metropoli-
tan centers faced less daunting conditions. Hamburg, for example, was not forced 
to cut costs on introducing its Metrobuses, and Munich had considerably more 
time to incorporate input from its residents and district representatives. 
The new daytime schedules went into effect in December 004. In May 006, the 
MetroLines, which had operated only during the day until this time, started 4-
hour-service; these new lines are now available 4 hours a day, 7 days a week. This 
change was part of a general expansion of nighttime service that also included the 
metro (underground) system. Berlin thus took another step toward being “open 
around the clock.” Figure  presents an overview of the project plan.
In the beginning the planning process was analyzed to determine its strengths 
and weaknesses, and a target process was developed whose structure and agreed-
upon milestones were designed to coordinate both the various BVG internal areas 
(mainly the central marketing department including both service development 
and marketing communications, the metro, tram, and bus divisions, central con-
trolling, and workers’ representatives) and external partners (especially the Berlin 
State Senate as the authorizing agency, district offices and traffic commissions, 
the public transport federation, the S-Bahn [commuter rail company], passenger 
organizations, and the customers themselves). As it turned out, both internal and 
external resistance to such a process of change cannot be underestimated.
In three further stages of analysis, the BVG studied customer needs, competition 
between public transportation and individual cars in Berlin, and capacity utiliza-
tion levels in its transport systems to systematically expand its existing databases, 
some of which were good, but others of which showed gaps. In planning nighttime 
services, it used a part-time matrix for the first time to determine demand.
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Factors in Selecting Transportation Services
Innumerable studies have been done on what customers want from public trans-
portation systems. Most of them, however, generate a comprehensive catalog 
of needs and conclude that customers are dissatisfied with virtually everything 
or that they see potential for improvement just about everywhere and that 
regular customers are even more critical than occasional customers. As far as 
company decisions go, these studies are usually not helpful because they offer 
no approaches for how best to utilize scarce resources. Instead, priority must be 
given to projects that improve services in such a way that they actually attract new 
customers, as opposed to only increasing the satisfaction of customers that the 
company already has anyway.
On the basis of the studies that it employed with different methodologies, the 
BVG therefore explicitly sought to identify the crucial commercial factors whose 
improvement could lead directly to an increase in the number of customers. The 
studies revealed that 80 percent of respondents desire short travel times, a result 
that far surpassed all other suggested ways of improving public transportation 
services in Berlin. The conclusion that travel time is the dominant factor may 
appear trivial, yet on closer examination it is astonishing how the other factors 
pale in comparison—including safety and cleanliness, which together accounted 
for only  percent of total responses. Among other things, the fact that these 
criteria are currently adequately met reflects the BVG’s intention not to discour-
age any customers from public transportation (which is not to deny that some 
customers would desire further improvements in these areas). The same is true for 
a virtually nonexistent willingness on the part of Berliners to pay more for a greater 
level of comfort. Although many customers would surely be pleased about fur-
ther improvements in comfort, a sufficient level has already been achieved. More 
advances in comfort would therefore attract hardly any more customers. 
The crucial factor of travel time comprises the entire journey from door to door, 
as compared to the alternative of driving a private car. The major constituent ele-
ments in door-to-door public transportation service are the following: 
• average speed of public transport vehicles
• intervals between vehicles (i.e., the amount of time spent waiting for the 
initial vehicle and any subsequent vehicles following transfers)
• number and/or necessity of transfers
• density of stations or stops (i.e., the distance from residence and destination 
to the nearest station or stop)
Journal of Public Transportation, Vol. 11, No. 3, 2008
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A very detailed study of these elements showed that the majority of respondents 
placed the highest priority on short intervals between vehicles. If faced with a 
choice between service running at very short intervals (0 minutes or less) and a 
somewhat greater distance to the nearest station or stop (0- to 5-minute walk) 
versus service running at longer intervals (0 minutes) with a station or stop in 
the immediate vicinity, the overwhelming majority preferred the longer walk. The 
lines with the highest levels of customer satisfaction are those that run at intervals 
so short that customers do not even need to look at the timetable.
To attract new customers at the same level of resources, one must also consider 
cutting service on infrequently-used lines or stops and accepting the resulting 
slight decline in passenger volume to shorten intervals on well-frequented lines to 
0 minutes or less. Customers will also accept up to two transfers if short intervals 
(or optimized connections) mean that they only have to wait for a short period of 
time (see Figure ).
Competitor Analysis
The high importance that trip duration has on the choice of transportation is 
clear not only from the study results, but also from considering the actual modal 
split values on different corridors. A competitor analysis was performed based 
on traffic simulations that used many counts of adjusted, comprehensive spatial 
comparisons of travel times for public transportation versus private cars. The 
spatial units studied represented the traffic cells and fractions of traffic cells for 
the Berlin metropolitan area. The study was designed to compare the following 
for different subcells:
• changing levels of demand for transportation in general
• travel times for public transportation versus private cars 
• market shares for public transportation
Traffic flows whose results exceeded certain ratios for the above points can be 
viewed as promising areas for acquiring new customers (i.e., as areas where there 
is a need for action). With around  million possible ratios, the BVG analysis there-
fore focused on traffic flows that are large (high level of potential traffic consolida-
tion), that currently have a high share of private car traffic, and that show relatively 
poor travel times for public transportation (see Figure 3 for example). Here, new 
customers could be induced to make the switch from private cars to public trans-
portation by means of improved service such as new direct connections, acceler-
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ated transit, or shorter intervals. A relevant number of such ratios were found and 
used to plan concrete measures (see Figure 4).
Of course, there are many other reasons than relative travel times that influence 
the modal split, such as sociodemographic structures at the source and destina-
tion areas, availability of private cars, and regional parking facilities. By far the 
clearest correlation, however, is found between the modal split and relative travel 
times. The following conclusions were reached:
• For door-to-door service, private cars are faster than public transportation 
on all high-demand corridors.
• Public transportation can achieve very high market shares of more than 80 
percent as long as it requires no more than one and a half to two times as 
much time as private cars.
• Public transportation still retains a relatively high market share of around 30 
percent (for “captive” users) even if it offers extremely poor travel times.
Capacity Analysis
Whereas the “top-down” competitor analysis was designed to yield primarily new 
customer potential for public transportation, a “bottom-up” capacity analysis was 
used to determine how well current service meets the demand and what if any 
potential for savings might be present. Capacity was calculated precisely in the 
form of seat kilometers divided by passenger kilometers expressed in percent, with 
standing room calculated on the basis of four persons per square meter of standing 
space. This means that when capacity utilization levels reach around 40 percent, 
all the seats are occupied and the carriage gives the subjective impression of being 
full. Capacity utilization levels of more 50 percent can occur during rush hour, but 
are not necessarily desirable from the perspective of comfort. By contrast, capacity 
utilization levels of under 5 percent are a clear indication of oversupply.
More precise considerations are, of course, needed to adjust capacity exactly to 
individual lines. Here, however, some general statements can be made using the 
example of the bus network (see also Figure 5).
• In overall terms, capacity utilization in the Berlin bus network shows con-
siderable fluctuation. It averages around 7 percent, with some lines above 
30 percent and many below 0 percent.
• Capacity utilization is high when buses serve axes with important feeder 
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functions for the rapid transit system or major arteries leading to the city 
center.
• Capacity utilization is low on many supplementary lines inside the Berlin 
S-Bahn (commuter rail) ring, as well as in the thinly populated outlying 
areas.
• During rush hour, capacity utilization is high, as expected. The lowest levels 
are in the early morning hours of the weekends.
Strategic Guidelines
Results gained from the three different analysis modules—customer demand, 
competition, and capacity—were used to develop strategic guidelines for network 
planning, which, in turn, had to be approved both internally and by the city gov-
ernment. The public transportation network was more precisely differentiated, 
namely into a core network whose services were improved, and a supplementary 
network that ensures minimum service. The core network of the commuter rail 
(S-Bahn) and metro (U-Bahn) systems was expanded to include the newly created 
MetroLines, which are not to be confused with underground metro service but 
rather consist of buses and trams that serve major traffic axes. MetroLine service 
was improved such that customers can use these lines as easily as the underground 
metro lines (i.e., without having to know the timetables). In addition,  
• They run throughout the day at short intervals of no more than 0 min-
utes.
• Their lines follow major traffic axes in straight lines wherever possible.
• Their links are designed to create a “spider web” similar to that of the com-
muter rail (S-Bahn) and metro (U-Bahn) system.
The MetroLines represent a spatial expansion of the core network into the outly-
ing districts of the city, and their service also includes tangential connections. 
Viewed in terms of the usual catchment areas surrounding stations and stops, 
the new core network consisting of the commuter rail, underground metro, and 
new MetroLines now covers 87 percent of the residents of Berlin. The commuter 
rail and underground metro systems alone previously provided only slightly more 
than 70 percent of the population with premium transportation services.
The supplementary network complies with the directives of the municipal public 
transportation plan. It continues to ensure that 97 percent of all Berlin residents 
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live within 300 meters of a bus stop or within 600 to ,000 meters of a commuter 
rail or metro station. In the supplementary network, buses run at intervals of 
0 minutes or less and on high-volume lines at intervals of 0 minutes or less. 
Although some reductions occurred in service here, almost all of these affect 
peripheral times of day or corridors that are sufficiently covered by other high-
grade lines. Only a few lines were entirely discontinued, primarily those that for 
historical reasons ran parallel to the commuter rail (S-Bahn).
This hierarchical structure of the transportation network, which enables service to 
be adapted much more closely to actual traffic flow patterns, has made it possible 
to provide a higher frequency for 37 percent of Berlin’s residents, thus improving 
service. Service remained essentially the same for 58 percent of residents. Only 5 
percent of the city’s residents were faced with reductions in service, which never-
theless remained at acceptable levels in the eyes of the BVG. As expected, how-
ever, when the changes were made, the 5 percent of residents whose service was 
reduced were considerably more vocal in their reactions than those who benefited 
from the changes.
Communicating with Customers
The BVG broke new ground via a number of different channels in its dialog with 
customers (on-site, Internet, media), which was also designed to help customers 
understand the reasons for the changes and to neutralize potential criticism at 
an early stage. Considerable resources were devoted to communications and to 
strengthening customer loyalty. This was money well spent from today’s perspec-
tive because this “partial democratization” of the process minimized the risk of 
planning errors from the start. Customers could inform themselves about the 
overall project as well as cast votes for individual lines via surveys, on the Internet, 
and at public events.
Another major element in the dialog with customers consisted of detailed on-site 
information about the changes in the form of “micromarketing.” Sixty different 
flyers with a total circulation of . million were printed and distributed to house-
holds as well as to information stands, sales offices, and contact points such as 
shops. It turned out, however, that the expectations raised by this BVG campaign 
could hardly be met—complaints came from households that did not receive fly-
ers, while the innovative new sales strategy of using small neighborhood shops was 
ignored by the media.
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The micromarketing campaign was criticized, and justifiably so, for not present-
ing a sufficiently clear overview of all relevant information. Further criticism was 
directed at the belated distribution of the timetables, which were not ready until 
the very day that service changed. This tardiness was due in large part to the 
fact that the Berlin State Senate stipulated last-minute modifications as part of 
its approval process. In fact, the BVG did not actually receive its legally-required 
authorization of the lines until one day before the scheduled change in service.
As far as the customers are concerned, the MetroLines fulfill their promise of 
simplifying service. Just like the rapid transit system, most customers do not have 
to study the timetables anymore, or for that matter even look at them. This prod-
uct also improves orientation within the enormous network of the Berlin urban 
area. Trains and MetroLines can be used for long distances and to reach major 
destinations, while “normal” bus and tram lines, ferries, demand-based services, 
and nighttime lines provide finer meshed coverage and take customers to their 
precise destinations. The “always there” promise provides not only spatial orienta-
tion but also a clear commitment to temporal coverage. The underground metro 
and MetroLines offer reliable service at nonpeak periods of the day and at night 
to customers who at these times are generally less familiar with the network and 
timetables. Nighttime service thus plays a crucial role in upholding the promises 
made by the new product and service network. It was redesigned in May 006.
Nighttime Service
The historical origins of nighttime service are rooted in the need to bring BVG staff 
to their depots and terminal stations before the start of (daytime) operation, and 
to take them home again after service stopped at night. Thus, nighttime service 
was completely different from its daytime counterpart because the two networks 
had largely different destinations as well as customers. Although the original night-
time network underwent many changes over subsequent decades, it remained 
very different from daytime service. Yet the demand for nighttime service has 
now become much more similar to that for the day. Mobility in the night is now 
marked by more customer groups than before. While nighttime mobility used 
to be mainly the province of the above-mentioned transport staff as well as shift 
workers in industry, public utilities, and hospitals, it now includes more customer 
groups and transport purposes. New types of jobs across a broad range of service 
sectors as well as the widespread use of these services account for a large part of 
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this growth, in addition to expansions in leisure activities and tourism. Mobility for 
the purpose of shopping has now also extended into the night in Berlin.
The BVG’s analysis of nighttime transportation showed only a slightly lower share 
of the market than for the day. Nighttime traffic has increased, and also shows a 
greater distribution over most of the central parts of the city. More pronounced 
traffic flows are evident here than before, with affinities for public transporta-
tion.
Based on these conclusions, the new design for the nighttime network included 
4-hour service for the MetroLines, 4-hour underground metro service on week-
ends, and better connections.
When the new timetables went into effect in May 006, they also included connec-
tions to the new Berlin Central Train Station as well as reductions in service for the 
early hours of the weekends. The MetroLines now run 4 hours a day, 7 days a week 
(see Figure 6). From 6:00 A.M. until 9:00 P.M. they run at intervals of 0 minutes or 
less (some at intervals of 3⅓ or 5 minutes). From 4:30 to 6:00 A.M. and from 9:00 
P.M. to :30 A.M., they run at intervals of 0 or 0 minutes. During the nighttime 
period from :30 to 4:30 A.M., the MetroLines run at intervals of 5 or 30 minutes. 
The underground metro now runs during the night on all lines at 5-minute inter-
vals, although only on Fridays, Saturdays, and before holidays. On weekday nights, 
the metro trains are replaced by bus lines that serve the same lines and stations. 
Connections, which had already been coordinated by a computer-supported sys-
tem, have been increased in number and more clearly publicized, such as in the 
BVG’s public transportation atlas, which is issued at regular intervals.
Around 90 percent of the BVG’s customers now note that the same lines they 
use during the day also run at night. The BVG is therefore anticipating mutual 
reinforcement between night and day (i.e., greater use of public transportation 
during the day or night is expected to encourage a higher average number of trips 
for individual customers).
More Customers Mean Higher Revenues
All in all, the BVG views its BVG 005 Plus project as a complete success, and thus 
it appears that the circle has indeed been squared (see Figure 7). This project has 
enabled the BVG to reduce the annual volume of its operations by 4 million kilo-
meters, with most of these savings taking place in the bus division. This figure is 
lower than the original target for the project, because objections by residents and 
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municipal authorities meant that not all the money-saving measures could be 
implemented. Yet it still enabled a considerable reduction in operations that has 
resulted in savings of 9.5 million euros per year, as well as an increase of 4 mil-
lion new trips—or  percent of total demand (see Figure 8). Moreover, it has also 
led to greater revenues for other companies, especially the S-Bahn Berlin GmbH 
(commuter rail), which, without changing its own services, has benefited from 
improved feeder lines and the elimination of parallel bus lines. 
Passenger counts carried out over the entire BVG network in 005 and 006 to 
assess the changes in demand show that the anticipated increase in passenger 
volume has in fact taken place. In terms of development, the MetroLines have 
proven to be especially attractive. Not only has the number of customers shown 
a clear increase where service intervals were shortened, but the largely unchanged 
lines have also gained customers thanks to enhanced marketing of the core net-
work and the product promise of the MetroLines. Ticket revenues have also risen 
as expected, which indicates that the increased number of rides is due in fact to 
newly acquired customers as opposed to more intensive use of monthly passes.
These figures as well as several other effects enter into the BVG’s annual accounts 
of revenue and passenger volume. But still other effects, such as fare hikes, counter 
these positive results by lowering the number of customers. In a study for the year 
005, the BVG performed a detailed investigation of these different effects and 
determined their quantitative outcomes. With respect to ticket revenues, two 
negative effects were met by seven positive effects, including optimized service. 
Regarding passenger volumes, four negative effects (including the fare hikes) faced 
three positive effects, also including optimized service.
Berlin’s public transportation services are now entering a phase that will not 
feature large-scale changes, during which both current and potential customers 
can become better acquainted with the newly designed network. The BVG will 
support this process with the help of targeted product information, advertising, 
and enhanced sales activities. In view of developments, such as those in Hamburg 
where the MetroLines continued to attract new customers several years after 
their introduction, the BVG hopes to enjoy increasing passenger volumes as well 
as revenues well after the project is concluded.
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